THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NSC REVIEW COMPLETED, 7/2/03.

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October 31, 1962

NSC Executive Committee Record of Action, October 31, 1962, 10:00 AM Meeting No. 14

- 1. Director McCone stated that aerial photographs taken on Casober 29 were inconclusive.
- 2. Secretary Rusk reported the although discussions with Soviet officials indicated that the Rust inside prepared to go along with general inspection procedures at this concessary, Castro, in his conversations yesterday with Acting Secretary U Thant, was adamant in his opposition to inspection.
- 3. Secretary Rusk recommended, and the President agreed, to postpone the President's press conference with the background explanation that Cuban opposition to acceptable inspection procedures created
 a situation which he did not wish to discuss publicly at this time.
- 4. The President approved draft instructions to our UN Mission in New York which spell out Cuban inspection procedures acceptable to us. The third phase of inspection covering procedures acceptable to us after the removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba will be discussed with the President at a later meeting.
- 5. The President directed that reconnaissance missions be flown tomorrow unless significant progress is made in the U Thant-Castro discussions. He agreed to informing the Soviets that Cuban opposition to procedures satisfactory to the Russians was causing us serious difficulties which might call for a U.S. USSR agreement on aerial reconnaissance, rather than UN arrangements, if Castro continues his opposition.
- The Inverse Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspects. Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspects. Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspects. Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspects. Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspects. Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspects. Red Cross may be unwilling to proceed with adequate inspects. Considers as given to broadening the plockade, including POL, in order to be pressure on the Cubans to accept inspection measures. This proposal would involve the hailing and passing to a configuration of Russian ships, but the halting of non-Bloc ships carrying go ded in the broader blockade.

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7. The President asked that the OAS be told of Castro's opposition to inspection procedures so that, in the event he continues his opposition, the Latin American countries would be geared up to support future actions we may be required to take.

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